DRAFT

Ulric B. and Evelyn L. Bray Social Sciences Seminar

Monday, October 23, 2017
4:00pm to 5:00pm
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Baxter B125
Electoral Competition with Rationally Inattentive Voters
Filip Matejka, Associate Professor with Tenure, CERGE-EI; Research Affiliate, Center for Economic and Policy Research,

Abstract: This paper studies how voters' selective ignorance interacts with policy design by political candidates. It shows that the selectivity empowers voters with extreme preferences and small groups, divisive issues attract most attention and public goods are underfunded. Finer granularity of information increases these inefficiencies. Rational inattention can also explain why competing candidates do not always converge on the same policy issues, and how the poor are politically empowered by welfare programs.

For more information, please contact Letty Diaz by phone at 626-395-1255 or by email at letty.diaz@caltech.edu or visit the full paper "Electoral Competition with Rationally Inattentive Voters.".