DRAFT

CANCELLED Bray Theory Workshop

Tuesday, December 6, 2016
4:00pm to 5:00pm
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Baxter B125
Broad sequential equilibria of multi-stage games with infinite sets of signals and actions
Roger Myerson, Glen A. Lloyd Distinguished Service Professor of Economics, University of Chicago; Visiting Associate in Economics, Caltech,

 


PLEASE NOTE: THIS WORKSHOP HAS BEEN CANCELLED.

In this talk, Myerson will consider how to extend Kreps and Wilson's 1982 definition of sequential equilibrium to multi-stage games with infinite sets of types and actions. A concept of open sequential equilibrium is defined by taking limits of strategy profiles that can consistently satisfy approximate sequential rationality for all players at arbitrarily large…nite collections of observable open events. Existence of open sequential equilibria is shown for a broad class of regular projective games. Examples are considered to illustrate the properties of this solution and the difficulties of alternative approaches to the problem of extending sequential equilibrium to infinite games.

For more information, please contact Barbara Estrada by phone at 626-395-4083 or by email at bestrada@caltech.edu.