DRAFT

Ulric B. and Evelyn L. Bray Social Sciences Seminar

Tuesday, April 12, 2022
4:00pm to 5:00pm
Add to Cal
Baxter Lecture Hall
Bilateral trade under no subsidies and stochastic mechanisms; Multi-trader pairwise exchange with minimal subsidies
Jernej Copic, Visiting Associate in Economics, Caltech,

Abstract: A complete complete characterization of bilateral trade mechanisms under ex-post incentive and participation constraints and no subsidies (as opposed to strict budget balance). The method, which is also novel, is based on convexity (as opposed to envelope theorem arguments, which in this case cannot handle the problem). I will demonstrate that disposing of the numeraire is in some cases optimal for welfare -- it may attain a (Pareto) more efficient allocation under the constraints. The characterization is useful, for example for finding an optimal solution to the problem of a broker (with no private information) who wants to attain optimal profit, under the incentive and participation constraints of the two traders, by charging trading fees to the two traders. In part 2, time permitting, I will describe a new approach to a decentralized exchange, where many traders may interact in pair-wise exchanges of many different (non-heterogenous) goods. Traders are bound by tight budget constraints so that monetary transfers are not sufficient to facilitate exchange of goods.

For more information, please contact Letty Diaz by phone at 626-395-1255 or by email at letty.diaz@caltech.edu.