CURRICULUM VITAE
Thomas R. Palfrey, III
Contact Information:
Division
of the Humanities and Social Sciences
228-77
Caltech
Email:
trp at hss.caltech.edu
Phone:
626-395-4088
Fax:
626-432-1726
Education:
Ph.D. Social Sciences, Caltech, 1981
M.A. Political Science,
B.A. Political Science (magna cum laude),
Primary positions:
2002-2005, 2006- Flintridge
Foundation Professor of Economics and Political Science, Caltech
2004-6
Professor of Politics and Economics,
1986-2002 Professor of Economics and
Political Science, Caltech
1985-86 Professor of
Economics and Political Economy, GSIA,
1983-85 Associate
Professor of Economics, GSIA, Carnegie-Mellon University
1980-83 Assistant Professor
of Economics, GSIA,
Other Positions:
2006 Martha
and Jonathan Cohen Distinguished Visitor,
2006-7
Chaire d’Excellence
Pierre de Fermat, Université de
2004-6
Director,
2002-4
Director,
Hacker Social Science Experimental Laboratory (SSEL), Caltech
2000-4 Founding Co-Director,
2001-2
Executive Officer
for the Social Sciences, Caltech
2000-2
Founding Co-Director,
Caltech-MIT Voting Technology Project
1998-2000
Founding Director, Hacker Social
Science Experimental Laboratory (SSEL), Caltech
2005
Visiting Scholar, GREQAM,
Université d’Aix-
2005
Directeur d'Etudes, Ecole
des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales
2003
Visiting Scholar, Institut
d'Analisi Economica, Universitat Autonoma,
2003
Visiting Professor of
Economics, GREMAQ, Université de Toulouse
2002-3
Visiting Professor
of Economics,
2002-3
Visiting Scholar
in Economics,
2002
Visiting Scholar in
Economics,
2001-2
Visiting Professor
of Economics, UCLA
2001-2
Visiting Professor
of Economics, GREMAQ, Université de Toulouse
2001
Visiting Professor of
Economics, GREQAM, Université d’Aix-Marseilles
1999
Visiting Professor of
Economics, GREQAM, Université d’Aix-Marseilles
1995-96
Chargé de Mission, Laboratoire
d'Economie Industrielle, CREST-INSEE
1995-96
Chercheur Invité, CERAS, Ecole
des Ponts et Chaussées
1995
Chercheur Invité, IDEI,
Université de Toulouse
1995
Visiting Professor of
Economics, GREQAM, Université d’Aix-Marseilles
1992
Kirby Distinguished
Visiting Professor,
1990
Visiting Professor of
Economics, GREMAQ, Université de Toulouse
1990
Directeur d'Etudes, Ecole
des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales
Research Areas:
Economic
Theory, Mechanisms Design, Public Economics, Formal Political Theory,
Experimental Economics and Political Science, Game Theory, Voting and Elections
Teaching:
Undergraduate,
MBA, PhD, and Executive Training courses in: Game Theory, Economic Theory,
Microeconomics, Economics of Information and Uncertainty, Mechanism Design,
Industrial Organization, Experimental Economics, Decision Theory, Voting
Theory, Electoral Politics, Political Economy, Formal Political Theory, Social
Choice Theory, and General Equilibrium Theory.
Awards and Grants:
National Science Foundation Grant SES‑8208397, 1982‑1984
National
Science Foundation Grant IST‑8406296, 1984‑1986
National
Science Foundation Grant SES-8608118, 1986-1988
National
Science Foundation Grant SES-8718650, 1988-1990
National
Science Foundation Grant SES-8815097, 1988-1990
National
Science Foundation Grant SES-9011828, 1990-1992
National
Science Foundation Grant SES-9224787, 1993-1996
National
Science Foundation Grant SBR-9223701, 1993-1996
National
Science Foundation Grant SBR-9631627, 1996-1999
National
Science Foundation Grant MRI-9977244, 1999-2002
National
Science Foundation Grant INT-9815573, 1999-2002
National
Science Foundation Grant SES-0079301, 2000-2003
National
Science Foundation Grant SES-0094800, 2001-2006
National
Science Foundation Grant SES-0214013, 2002-2005
National
Science Foundation Grant SES-0617820,
2006-2009
Fellow,
Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, 1986-7
Fellow,
Econometric Society, elected 1995
Professional Service:
Econometric
Society:
Program Chair, 1997 North American Summer Meetings; Program Committee: 1990 World
Congress, 2004 North American Winter Meeting, 2004 North American Summer
Meeting, 2005 World Congress, 2006 North American Winter Meeting, 2006 European
Meeting, 2006 North American Winter Meeting; various administrative and
nomination committees. Invited Lectures: 1990 World Congress, 1994 European
Meeting; 2006 Far Eastern Meeting.
Economic
Science Association: Executive Board (1988-99); President-Elect (1993-1995); President
(1995-1997); Vice President (1997-1999). Invited Plenary Lecture: 2000 Annual
meeting.
Game
Theory Society:
Charter Member.
NSF
Advisory Panel
(Economics): 1987-89.
Refereeing: scientific journals in
economics, political science, marketing, finance, and related fields in social
science and business; scientific foundations; academic publishing houses.
Editorial
Positions:
Econometrica: Associate Editor, 1989-1998;
2004-2007
Games and Economic Behavior: Editor 2007- Associate Editor
1992-2007 Guest editor:July 1995, May 2005
Review of Economic Design: Associate Editor, 1992-
Economic Theory: Editorial Board, 1995-1999
Experimental Economics: Editorial Board, 1997-
Journal of Public Economics: Associate Editor, 1998-2003
Economics Bulletin: Associate Editor, 2000-2003
NAJ Economics: Editorial Board, 2001-
PUBLICATIONS
Monographs
Bayesian Implementation (with S. Srivastava), Harwood Academic Publishers:
Voting: What is, What Could Be (with Caltech-MIT Voting
Technology Project), 2001.
Edited Volumes
Laboratory Research in Political Economy, University of Michigan Press:
Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1991.
Experimental
Foundations of Political Science (with Donald Kinder), University of
Published Articles
"Multiple Object, Discriminatory Auctions with Bidding Constraints:
A Game-Theoretic Analysis," Management Science (September 1980, v.
26, #9, pp. 935-46).
"Asset Valuation in an Experimental Market," (with R. E.
Forsythe and C. R. Plott), Econometrica (May 1982, v. 50, #3, pp.
537-67).
"An Experimental Examination of Auction Mechanisms for Discrete
Public Goods," (with J. A. Ferejohn, R. E. Forsythe and R. G. Noll), in Research
in Experimental Economics 2,
"Risk Advantages and Information Acquisition,"
"Bundling Decisions by a Multiproduct Monopolist with Incomplete
Information," Econometrica (March 1983, v. 51, #2, pp. 463-83).
"A Strategic Calculus of Voting" (with H. Rosenthal), Public
Choice (1983, v. 41, pp. 7-53).
"Warranties, Performance, and the Resolution of Buyer-Seller
Disputes," (with T. Romer)
"Spatial Equilibrium with Entry," Review of Economic
Studies (January 1984, v. 51, pp. 139-56).
"Participation and the Provision of Discrete Public Goods: A
Strategic Analysis," (with H. Rosenthal) Journal of Public Economics
(1984, v. 24, pp. 171-93).
"Futures Markets and Informational Efficiency: A Laboratory
Examination," (with R. E. Forsythe and C. R. Plott) The Journal of
Finance (1984, v. 39, #4, pp. 955-81).
"Buyer Behavior and the Welfare Effects of Bundling by a
Multiproduct Monopolist: A Laboratory Test," in Research in
Experimental Economics 3,
"Uncertainty Resolution, Private Information Aggregation, and the
Cournot Competitive Limit," Review of Economic Studies (January
1985, v. 52, pp. 69-83).
"Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty," (with H.
Rosenthal) American Political Science Review (March 1985, v. 79, pp.
62-78).
"Pareto Optimality in Spatial Voting Models," (With P.
Coughlin) Social Choice and Welfare (1985, v. 1, pp 307-19).
"Repeated Insurance Contracts and Learning," (with C. Spatt) Rand
Journal of Economics (Autumn 1985, v. 16, #3, pp. 356-67).
"An Experimental Study of Warranty Coverage and Dispute Resolution
in Competitive Markets," (With T. Romer), in Empirical Approaches to Consumer
Protection Economics, P. Ippolito and D. Scheffman (eds.) Federal Trade
Commission (1986), pp. 307-72.
"Private Information in Large Economies," (with
"Institutional Social Choice in Representative Systems," Public
Choice (1986).
"The Relationship Between Constituency Size and Turnout: Using Game
Theory to Estimate the Cost of Voting," (with S. Hansen and H. Rosenthal) Public
Choice (1987, 52(1), 15-34).
"On Bayesian Implementable Allocations," (with S. Srivastava) Review
of Economic Studies (April 1987, v. 54, pp. 193-208).
"The Relationship Between Information, Ideology, and Voting
Behavior," (with K. Poole) American Journal of Political Science
(August 1987, v. 31, #3, pp. 511-30).
"Private Incentives in Social Dilemmas: The Effects of Incomplete
Information and Altruism," (with H. Rosenthal) Journal of Public
Economics (April 1988, v. 35, pp. 309-32).
"Agendas, Strategic Voting, and Signaling with Incomplete
Information," (with P. Ordeshook) American Journal of Political Science
(May 1988, v. 32, #2, pp. 441-66).
"Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange
Economies," (with S. Srivastava) Econometrica (January 1989, v. 57,
#1, pp. 115-34).
"Mechanism Design with Incomplete Information: A Solution to the
Implementation Problem," (with S. Srivastava) Journal of Political
Economy (June 1989, v. 97, #31, pp. 668-91).
"Effects of Insider Trading Disclosures on Speculative Activity and
Futures Prices," (with R. Jagannathan) Economic Inquiry (July 1989,
v. 27, pp. 411-30).
"A Mathematical Proof of Duverger's Law," in Models of
Strategic Choice in Politics (Peter C. Ordeshook, ed.) University of
Michigan Press: Ann Arbor 1989, pp. 69-91.
"Theories and Tests of Blind Bidding in Sealed-bid Auctions,"
(with R. E. Forsythe and R. M. Isaac) Rand Journal of Economics (Summer
1989, v. 20, #2, pp. 214-38).
"Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty About Costs," (with P.
Cramton) International Economic Review (February 1990, v. 31, #1, pp.
17-47).
"Testing for Effects of Cheap Talk in a Public Goods Game with
Private Information," (with H. Rosenthal) Games and Economic Behavior
(1991, v. 3, pp. 183-220).
"Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies," (with S.
Srivastava) Econometrica (1991, v. 59, #2, pp. 479-501).
"Testing Game-Theoretic Models of Free Riding: New Evidence on
Probability Bias and Learning," (with H. Rosenthal) in Laboratory
Research in Political Economy (Thomas R. Palfrey, ed.), University of
"Efficient Trading Mechanisms with Pre-play Communication,"
(with S. Srivastava) Journal of Economic Theory (1991, v. 55, #1, pp.
17-40).
"An Experimental Political Science? Yes, an Experimental Political
Science," (with D. Kinder), The Political Methodologist (Spring
1991, v. 4, #1, pp. 2-8).
"An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game," (with R. McKelvey)
Econometrica (1992, v. 60, #4, pp. 803-36).
"Implementation in Bayesian Equilibrium: The Multiple Equilibrium
Problem in Mechanism Design," (in Advances in Economic Theory Vol. 1
(J.-J. Laffont ed.), Econometric Society Monographs No. 20. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 283-323.
"On Behalf of an Experimental Political Science" (with D.
Kinder), in Experimental Foundations of Political Science (D. Kinder and
T. Palfrey, eds.), University of
"The Conflict Between Private Incentives and the Public Good"
(with D. Kinder), in Experimental Foundations of Political Science (D.
Kinder and T. Palfrey, eds.), University of
"Signal and Noise in Democratic Conversation" (with D.
Kinder), in Experimental Foundations of Political Science (D. Kinder and
T. Palfrey, eds.), University of
"Agendas and Decisions in Government", in Experimental Foundations
of Political Science (D. Kinder and T. Palfrey, eds.), University of
"A Bayesian Sequential Experimental Study of Learning in
Games" (with M. El-Gamal and R. McKelvey) Journal of the American Statistical
Association 1993.
"Computational Issues in the Statistical Design and Analysis of
Experimental Games," (with M. El-Gamal and R. McKelvey) The
International Journal of Supercomputer Applications, (1993, v. 7 #3, pp.
189-200).
"Undominated Nash Implementation with Bounded Mechanisms,"
(with M. Jackson and S. Srivastava) Games and Economic Behavior, (1994,
v. 6, pp. 474-501).
"Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods
Mechanisms," (with J. Ledyard) Review of Economic Studies, (1994,
v. 61, pp. 327-55).
"Learning in Experimental Games," (with M. El-Gamal and R.
McKelvey) Economic Theory, (1994, v. 4, pp. 901-22).
"Repeated Play, Cooperation, and Coordination: An Experimental
Study," (with H. Rosenthal) Review of Economic Studies, (1994, v.
61, pp. 545-65).
"Vertigo: Comparing Structural Models of Imperfect Behavior in
Experimental Games," (with M. El-Gamal) Games and Economic Behavior
(1995, v. 8 pp. 322-48).
"The Holdout Game: An Experimental Study of an Infinitely Repeated
Game with Two-Sided Incomplete Information" (with R. McKelvey) in Social
Choice, Welfare, and Ethics (W. Barnett, H. Moulin, M. Salles, N. Schofield
eds.) Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium in Economic
Theory and Econometrics. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1995, pp.
321-49.
"Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement," (with P.
Cramton) Games and Economic Behavior (1995, v. 10, pp. 255-83).
"Quantal Response Equilibria in Normal Form Games," (with R.
McKelvey) Games and Economic Behavior (special issue on Experimental
Game Theory) (1995, v. 10, pp. 6-38).
"Introduction: Experimental Game Theory," (with J. Ledyard) Games
and Economic Behavior (special issue on Experimental Game Theory) (1995, v.
10, p. 1-5).
"Experiments on the Constant Sum Centipede Game," (with M. Fey
and R. McKelvey) International Journal of Game Theory (1996, v. 25, pp.
269-87).
"Altruism, Reputation, and Noise in Linear Public Goods
Experiemnts," (with J. Prisbrey) Journal of Public Economics (1996,
v. 61, pp. 409-27).
"Economical Experiments: Bayesian Efficient Experimental
Design," (with M. El-Gamal) International Journal of Game Theory
(1996, v. 25, pp. 495-517).
"In or Out? Centralization by Majority Vote," (with J. Crémer)
European Economic Review (special issue on The Domain of the State),
(1996, v. 40, pp. 43-60).
"A Statistical Theory of Equilibirum in Games," (with R.
McKelvey) Japanese Economic Review (1996, v. 47, #2, pp. 186-209).
"Endogeneity of Alternating Offers in a Bargaining Game,"
(with R. McKelvey) Journal of Economic Theory (1997, v. 73, #2, pp.
425-37).
"Anomalous Behavior in Linear Public Goods Experiments: How Much
and Why?" (with J. Prisbrey) American Economic Review, (December
1997, v. 87, #5, pp. 829-46).
"Campaign Spending and Incumbency: An Alternative Simultaneous
Equations Approach," (with R. Erikson) Journal of Politics, (May
1998, v. 60, #2, pp. 355-73).
"Quantal Response Equilibria in Extensive Form Games," (with
R. McKelvey) Experimental Economics, (1998, v. 1, pp. 9-41).
"Efficiency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated
Pairwise Bargaining," (with M. Jackson) Econometrica (November
1998, v. 66, #6, pp. 1353-88).
"A Characterization of Interim Efficiency with Public Goods,"
(with J.Ledyard) Econometrica (March 1999, v. 67, #2, pp. 435-48).
"Interim Efficiency in a Public Goods Problem," (with
J.Ledyard) in Social Organization and Mechanism Design (C. dAspremont,
ed.) (1999), pp. 239-61.
"Political Confederation," (with J. Crémer) American
Political Science Review (March 1999, v 93, #1, pp. 69-83).
"The Effects of Payoff Magnitude and Heterogeneity on Behavior in
2x2 Games with Unique Mixed Strategy Equilibria," (with R. McKelvey and R.
Weber) Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (2000, v. 42, pp.
523-48).
Federal Mandates by Popular Demand, (with J. Crémer) Journal of
Political Economy, (October 2000, v. 108, #5, pp. 905-27).
An Experimental Study of Jury Decision
Rules, (with R. McKelvey and
Equilibrium Effects in Campaign Spending Games: Theory and Data, (with
R. Erikson) American Political Science Review (2000, v. 94, #3, pp.
595-609).
Voluntary Implementation, (with M. Jackson) Journal of Economic
Theory (May 2001, v. 98, no. 1, pp. 1-25).
The Approximation of Efficient Public Good Mechanisms by Simple Voting
Schemes. (with J. Ledyard) Journal of Public Economics (February 2002,
v. 83, no. 2, pp. 153-72)
"Implementation Theory" in Handbook of Game Theory, Vol.
III (R. Aumann and S. Hart eds.), 2002.
Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model with a Favored Candidate, (with E.
Aragones) Journal of Economic Theory (Special issue on Political
Science), March 2002, v. 103, No. 1, pp. 131-61.
Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in First Price Auctions,
(with J. Goeree and C. Holt) Journal of Economic Theory (Special Issue
on Experimental Game Theory), May 2002, v. 104, no. 1, pp. 247-72.
Federal Mandates with Local Agenda Setters, (with J. Crémer) Review
of Economic Design (Special Issue on Electoral System Design), November
2002, v. 7, no. 3, pp. 279-96.
Corrigendum to “Voluntary Implementation” (with M. Jackson) Journal of Economic
Theory, May 2003, 110(1): 204-5.
Efficient Equilibria in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism with
Private Information, (with D. Laussel) Journal of Public
Economic Theory, July 2003, v. 5, no. 3, pp. 449-78.
Risk Averse Behavior in Generalized Matching Pennies Games, (with J.
Goeree and C. Holt) Games and Economic Behavior October 2003, v. 45, no.
1, pp. 97-113.
Spatial Competition Between Two Candidates of Different Quality: An
Experimental Study, (with
An Experimental Comparison of Collective Choice Procedures for
Excludable Public Goods, (with S. Gailmard), Journal of Public Economics.
August 2005. v. 89(8):1361-98.
Spatial Competition Between Two
Candidates of Different Quality: The Effects of Candidate Ideology and Private
Information. (with E. Aragones), in Social Choice and
Strategic Behavior: Essays in Honor of Jeffrey Scot Banks. D. Austen-Smith and J. Duggan
eds. Springer:
Richard Drummond McKelvey, Biographical Memoirs,
Special Issue of Games and
Economic Behavior in Honor of Richard D. McKelvey: Introduction, Games
and Economic Behavior May 2005, v. 51(2): 237-42.
Regular Quantal Response Equilibrium (with J. Goeree and C. Holt, Experimental Economics, 2005,
8(4), 347-67
Social Learning with Private and Common Values, (with J.
Goeree and B. Rogers). Economic Theory. June 2006, 28(2): 254-64.
An Experimental Study of Storable Votes, (with A. Casella and A. Gelman)
Games and Economic Behavior. October 2006, 57(1), 123-54.
An Equilibrium Model of Federalism with Externalities, (with J. Crémer) Journal
of Public Economics, November 2006, 90(10-11): 2091-2106.
Laboratory
Experiments. in Handbook of Political Economy. B. Weingast and
Quantal Response Equilibria: A Brief Synopsis, (with R. McKelvey), in Handbook
of Experimental Economics Results. C. Plott and V. Smith eds. Forthcoming
2007.
McKelvey and Quantal Response Equilibrium. in A Positive Change in
Political Science: The Legacy of Richard D. McKelvey’s Most Influential
Writings. J. Aldrich, J. Alt, and A. Lupia eds.
A General Characterization of Interim Efficient Mechanisms for
Independent Linear Environments, (with J. Ledyard) Journal of Economic
Theory, March 2007, 133(1): 441-66.
The Selection Effect in Auctions with Endogenous Entry: An Experimental
Study, (with
The Paradox of Voter Participation: A Laboratory Study (with D. Levine) American
Political Science Review, 2007, 101(February), 143-58.
Political Reputations and Campaign Promises (with
Self-Correcting Information Cascades, (with J. Goeree, B. Rogers, and R.
McKelvey) Review of Economic Studies, July 2007, 74(3): 733-62.
Efficiency, Equity, and Timing in Voting Mechanisms (with
M. Battaglini and R. Morton) American Political Science Review,
forthcoming 2007.
Quantal Response Equilibrium (with J. Goeree and C. Holt), in The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics,
second edition, forthcoming 2007.
Information Aggregation and
Strategic Abstention in Large Laboratory Elections (with M.
Battaglini and R. Morton). American Economic Review.
2008. In Press
Information Aggregation In Standing and Ad Hoc Committees (with N. Ali, J. Goeree, and
Working
Papers