Analyzing Legislatures
(Congressional Policy Formation and Legislative Process)
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Instructor: Matias Iaryczower.
Class meets T-R, 9 - 10:30 am @ Baxter 218.
Office Hours: Tuesdays 10:30 - 12:00 noon or by appointment.
Contact Information
Office: 312 Baxter
Email: miaryc@hss.caltech.edu
Phone: (626) 395-4061
Secretary: Victoria Mason (victoria@hss.caltech.edu;
301 Baxter; x3831)
About this Web Site:
I will post here copies of assignments, class slides and links to
online copies of selected articles. I will announce major postings in
lectures, but you may want to check this site on a regular basis.
Overview
Summary: This course is
devoted to
the study of legislatures, and in particular to how collective action
is resolved within collective bodies, with special
emphasis in the US Congress. The main methodology is that of
rational choice or positive political theory. Legislatures are representative assemblies with the power to adopt laws. This definition highlights three areas that are fundamental to their working. First is representation. To what extent do legislators internalize the preferences of those who elect them and act on their behalf? How do organized groups - such as lobbies - alter this link ? How do electoral systems alter representation? Second is the resolution of collective action. By our definition, legislatures are collective bodies (assemblies) which in one way or the other aggregate the preferences of their members into a policy decision binding for all assembly members and the individuals they represent (they adopt laws). This will generically depend on the internal institutions regulating the working of legislatures (descentralization to committtees, redistribution of power to the leadership of the chamber or of political parties, decision rules such as simple or supermajorities, etc). How do this rules emerge ? How do different institutions alter choices ? Third is the interaction with external politiical bodies with a formal say in policy making (other chamberrs have to concur in bicameral systems, the president can veto). What is the implication for policy outcomes of having a bicameral legislature instead of unicameral legislature ? Are Separation of Powers Systems preferable to Parliamentary Systems? In this course we will focus on the second point above: the resolution of collective action in legislatures. The main methodology is that of rational choice or positive political theory, but we will also draw from the work of traditional legislative scholars.
Schedule
The following schedule is tentative, and subject to revisionTexts
We will use several
books and papers throughout the course. All these (including suggested
but not required readings) are referenced below. 1. Austen-Smith, David and Jeffrey Banks (1998). Positive Political Theory I: Collective Preference. University of Michigan Press [ASB]
2. Austen-Smith, David and Jeffrey Banks (2005). Positive Political Theory II: Strategy and Structure. University of Michigan Press [ASB2]
3. Cox, Gary and Matthew McCubbins (1993). Legislative Leviathan. University of California Press. [CM]
4. Gibbons, Robert (1992). Game Theory for Applied Economists. Princeton University Press, NJ.
5. Oleszek, Walter J. (2004). Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process. CQ Press.
6. Riker, William (1982). Liberalism against Populism. Waveland Press. [R]
7. Shepsle, Kenneth and Bonchek, Mark (1997). Analyzing Politics [SB]