|
MATIAS
IARYCZOWER |
![]() |
|||||||
|
|||||||||
Research Interests My research is in the field of Positive Political Theory / Political Economy. I am particularly interested in exploring how different institutional designs affect collective decision-making in committees, both small (legislatures, courts) and large (electorates). My work uses Game Theory and Quantitative Methods.
We
estimate the ideology and quality of information of justices of state
supreme courts, using an equilibrium model with common values and
incomplete information. We allow both biases and the quality of
information to be influenced by the methods used to appoint and
retain members to the high court. The results allow us to compare the
unobservable traits of elected and appointed justices, and to perform
constitutional experiments evaluating abstract institutional systems.
We
introduce a model of elections in non-majoritarian systems that aims to
capture the link between competition in policies and competition in
campaign spending. We show that under some conditions spending caps and
compulsory voting can be pro-competitive, leading to an increase in the
number of parties contesting the elections.
We
estimate an equilibrium model of decision-making in the US Supreme
Court which takes into account both private information and ideological
differences between justices. We present a measure of the value of
information in the court, and perform counterfactual simulations to
draw implications for institutional design.
We
estimate a model of voting in Congress that allows for dispersed
information about the quality of proposals in an equilibrium context.
The results highlight the effects of bicameralism on policy outcomes.
In equilibrium, the Senate imposes an endogenous supermajority
rule of about four-fifths on members of the House.
We
argue that the number of candidates running for public office, their
ideological differentiation, and the intensity of campaign competition
are jointly determined in response to the incentives provided by the
electoral system. We provide a comparison between majoritarian and
proportional electoral systems.
We
consider strategic voting in sequential committees in a common value
setting with incomplete information. We show that the tally of votes in
the originating committee can aggregate and transmit relevant
information for members of the second committee in equilibrium, and
provide conditions for the composition and size of committees under
which this occurs.
We
argue that party discipline is endogenously determined by backbenchers' beliefs about the extent
of support to the leader within the party. We show that rewards/punishments that
can be distributed publicly and on the spot are necessary for the
leader to be powerful: without them, the leader can sway members' behavior with promises of future benefits only if a majority of the party supports the leader's preferred position in the first place.
We
provide conditions for judicial decisions to be sensitive to
legislative lobbying, and find that lobbying falls the more divided the
legislature is on the relevant issues. We apply this framework to
analyze supreme court labor decisions in Argentina.
In
this chapter, we place Argentina's Supreme Court in the broader
political context. We analyze the incentives and constraints faced by
Supreme Court justices, and the ability of the court to provide checks
to the elected branches of government. (This chapter draws heavily from
our paper "Judicial Independence in Unstable Environments".)
We
examine the independence of Argentina's Supreme Court. Our results
show an often defiant Court subject to constraints. We find that
judicial decision-making was strategic. The probability of voting
against the government increases the less aligned the justice is
with the President, but falls the stronger the control of the president
over the legislature.
Work in Progress
Other
Working Papers and Publications (In Spanish)
Political
Economy Workshop @ Caltech
![]() "Insect
Factory", by
Fede
![]() "Colorful Ryan, The Giraffe", by Fede ![]() And well...,
that's ...
me, by Fede.
![]() "Pumpkin",
by Fede
![]() "Untitled",
by Fede
![]() "Meet MRC
(the robot)",
by Fede
|
|||||||||