All talks will take place in 25 Baxter Hall (Building 77 on campus map)
Preliminary Program
9:30 - 10:00 Registration
10:00 - 11:00 Wojiech Olszewski, Northwestern University
The Folk Theorem for
Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring
11:00 - 11:15 Discussion led by Murali Agastya, University of Sydney and Caltech
11:15 - 12:15 Ichiro Obara, University of California - Los Angeles
When Does Cooperation Collapse? Recursive Bound, Private Information,
and Communication Equilibria
12:15 - 12:30
Discussion led by Harrison Cheng, University of Southern California
12:30 - 2:00 Lunch
2:00 - 3:00
David Miller, University of California - San Diego
The Dynamic Cost of Ex-post Incentive Compatibility in Repeated Games of
Private Information
3:00 - 3:15
Discussion led by Jernej Copic, Caltech
3:15 - 3:45 Coffee
3:45 - 4:45
Larry Samuelson, University of Wisconsin - Madison
Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships
4:45 - 5:00
Discussion led by Kenneth Binmore, University College London and Caltech
5:30 - Reception and Dinner