SISL Mini-Conference on Matching
February 29 - March 2, 2008
All talks will take place in 25 Baxter Hall (Building 77 on campus map)
Social Science and Information Laboratory (SISL) at Caltech
Conference Program
Friday, February 29th
8:30 - 9:00 Registration and Breakfast
9:00 - 9:45
Atila Abdulkadilogru, Duke University
Expanding 'Choice' in School
Choice
(joint with
Yeon-Koo Che and Yosuke Yasuda)
10:00 - 10:45 Guillaume
Haeringer, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona
Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study
(joint with
Caterina Calsamiglia and Flip Klijn)
11:00 - 11:45 Pat
Bajari, University of Minnesota
Complementarities and Collusion in an FCC Spectrum Auction
(joint with
Jeremy Fox)
11:45 - 1:30 Lunch
1:30 -
2:15
Marek Pycia, Penn State University
A
Theory of House Allocation and Exchange Mechanisms
(joint with
Utku Unver)
2:30 - 3:15
Jay Sethuraman, Columbia University
House Allocation with Fractional Endowments
(joint with
Stergios Athanassoglou)
3:15 - 3:45
Coffee
3:45 - 4:30 Bettina
Klaus, Maastricht University
Stochastic Stability for Roommate Markets
(joint with Flip Klijn and Markus Walzl)
4:45 -
5:30 Jeremy Fox, University
of Chicago
Estimating Matching Games with Transfers
6:00 -
Dinner
- Saladang Song
(363 South Fair Oaks Avenue, Pasadena)
Saturday, March 1st
8:30 - 9:00 Breakfast
9:00 - 9:45
Lars Ehlers, University of Montreal
Matching Markets under (In) Complete Information
(joint with
Jordi Masso)
10:00 - 10:45 Ali
Hortacsu, University of Chicago
Matching and Sorting in Online Dating
(joint with
Gunter J. Hitch and Dan Ariely)
11:00 - 11:45 Fuhito Kojima, Harvard University
Substitutes and Stability for Matching with Contracts
(joint with
John Hatfield)
11:45 - 1:30 Lunch
1:30 -
2:15
Utku Unver, University of Pittsburgh
Dynamic Kidney Exchange
2:30 - 3:15
Jorge Oviedo
The Blocking Lemma for a
Many-to-one Matching Model
3:15 - 3:45
Coffee
3:45 - 4:30 Muriel
Niederle, Stanford University
Matching through Decentralized Markets
(joint with
Leeat Yariv)
4:45 -
5:30 Onur Kesten, Carnegie
Mellon University
Why
do Popular Mechanisms Lack Efficiency in Random Environments?
5:30 -
6:15 Michael Ostrovsky, Stanford University
Two-sided Matching with Interdependent
Values
(joint with
Archishman Chakraborty and Alessandro Citanna)
6:15 - Reception and Dinner - Dabney Hall
Sunday, March 2nd
8:30 - 9:00 Breakfast
9:00 - 9:45
Jordi Masso, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona
The Multiple-partners
Assignment Game with Heterogeneous Sells and Multi-unit
Demands: Competitive Equilibria
(joint with Daniel Jaume and Alejandro Neme)
10:00 - 10:45 M. Bumin
Yenmez, Stanford Graduate School of Business
Median Stable Matching
(joint with
Michael Schwartz)
11:00 - 11:45 Flip
Klijn, Institute for Economic Analysis, CSIC
Stability, Decomposition, and Medians
(joint with Bettina Klaus)
12:00 - 1:00 Lunch