Confirmation and Induction, HPS/PI 122, Caltech, Spring 2006 - last updated: Apr 21, 2006
Instructor
Franz Huber
Office: 201A Dabney Office Hours: by appointment via Email: franz AT caltech DOT edu
Phone: 626-395-1737 (o) 626-796-2962 (h)
When and where?
Wedn, 7:00-9:55pm, 33 Baxter
Course Description
The term 'confirmation' is used in epistemology and the philosophy of science whenever observational data and evidence speak in favor of or support scientific theories and everyday hypotheses. Historically confirmation has been closely related to the problem of induction. One relation between confirmation and induction is that the conclusion H of an inductively strong argument with premise E is confirmed by E. If inductive strength comes in degrees and the inductive strength of the argument with premise E and conclusion H is equal to r, the degree of confirmation of H by E is likewise said to be equal to r.
We will begin by briefly reviewing Hume's formulation of the problem of induction. Then we jump to the middle of the twentieth century and Hempel's pioneering work on confirmation. Probability theory is the main mathematical tool for Carnap's inductive logic as well as for Bayesian confirmation theory. We will discuss various interpretations of probability, focusing on the relation between objective chances and subjective degrees of belief (this is especially important for the evaluation of statistical hypotheses). Carnap's inductive logic is based on a logical interpretation of probability. However, his heroic efforts to construct a logical probability measure in purely syntactical terms can be considered to have failed. Goodman's new riddle of induction will serve to illustrate the shortcomings of such a purely syntactical approach to confirmation. Carnap's work is nevertheless important because today's most popular theory of confirmation - Bayesian confirmation theory - is to a great extent the result of replacing Carnap's logical interpretation of probability with a subjective interpretation of probability as degree of belief qua fair betting ratio. For the rest of the course we will mainly be concerned with Bayesian confirmation theory. The way research is done in this field will be illustrated by a recent work on the so called problem of old evidence. The final sessions will be more critical and partly devoted to an alternative, viz. formal learning theory, as well as some of my own views. For more information see my overview article Confirmation.
Pre-requisite
This course requires a background in logic and probability theory as well as an introduction to philosophy (e.g. Knowledge and Reality, Hum/PI 9). If you would like to attend this course, but you do not meet these requirements, please do send me an e-mail (keep in mind that the max enrollment for this class is 17).
VERY IMPORTANT NOTE
It is very important to note that you are expected to read my overview article Confirmation in advance (it is part of the reading assignment anyway). On the basis of this article you have to choose your report topic (RT), and let me know your decision via e-mail by March 13, 2006, 10am. Please send me a ranking of three topics - for instance, RT 1 (Hempel I) > RT 2 (Hempel II) > RT 3 (Carnap).
The report topic is also the topic of your paper, which should be about 3.000 words long. A draft of the report/paper is due two weeks before your report. The final version of the paper is due one week after the report. For example, if your report topic is RT 1 (Hempel I), then the draft of your report/paper is due on March 29, you get my feedback on April 5, your report is on April 12, and the final paper is due on April 19.
Evaluation
The evaluation for this class has three components: class participation (44%), report (24%), paper (32%). The draft of your report/paper will not be graded. Your overall grade x is calculated as follows:
x = 1 - ([44(1-x1)p + 24(1-x2)p + 32(1-x3)p]/100])1/p, p = 2
with xi in [0,1] being your grade for the ith component, i = 1, 2, 3. The purpose of the parameter p is, of course, that I do not want you to write an excellent paper and to give a perfect report without showing up for the remaining classes; or to give a perfect report and to engage a lot in classroom, but to forget about the paper, because you fall in love on the weekend before the end of the term. The only acceptable excuses for not attending a class are attested illness and serious family reasons. For each class you are assigned a number in [0,1] that reflects your participation for that class (your overall class participation is the average of these numbers). If you show up r minutes late and r is in (15 x n,15 x (n + 1)], this number will be .2 x (n +1 ) less than it would have been otherwise.
For an A you need x > .91, for a B you need x > .8, for a C you need x > .67, for a D you need x > .52. You pass the class just in case you have an A or a B or a C or a D.
The following two encyclopediae are highly recommended whenever you look for further information about a particular topic or a certain philosopher:
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Course Calendar
*... technically difficult
Mar 29 - Franz Huber: Confirmation (2h)
- Course Mechanics and Assignment of Reports (1h)
Apr 5 - David Hume: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1h)
Further Reading: David Hume: A Treatise of Human Nature
- Alan Hajek: Interpretations of Probability (2h)
Further Reading: Rudolf Carnap: Two Concepts of Probability
Apr 12 - Carl Gustav Hempel: Studies in the Logic of Confirmation I (RT 1)
- Carl Gustav Hempel: Studies in the Logic of Confirmation II (RT 2)
- Rudolf Carnap: Logical Foundations of Probability (RT 3)
Further Reading: Franz Huber: Hempel's Logic of Confirmation
Franz Huber: The Logic of Theory Assessment
Apr 19 - Nelson Goodman: The New Riddle of Induction (RT 4)
Further Reading: Nelson Goodman: A Query on Confirmation
Rudolf Carnap: On the Application of Inductive Logic
Nelson Goodman: On Infirmities of Confirmation Theory
Rudolf Carnap: Reply to Nelson Goodman
Further Reading: Peter F. Strawson: Introduction to Logical Theory
Peter F. Strawson: On Justifying Induction
- David Lewis: A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance I (RT 5)
- David Lewis: A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance II (RT 6 - Michelle JIANG)
Further Reading: Ned Hall: Correcting The Guide to Objective Chance
David Lewis: Humean Supervenience Debugged
Michael Thau: Undermining and Admissibility
Further Reading: *Allen R. Bernstein and Frank Wattenberg: Nonstandard Measure Theory
Apr 26 - John Earman: Bayes or Bust? (ch. 3: RT 7 - Trevor Miles WILSON)
Further Reading: Branden Fitelson: Studies in Bayesian Confirmation Theory (ch. 1)
- John Earman: Bayes or Bust? (ch. 4.4-4.9: RT 8 - Jonathan Joseph SENN)
- John Earman: Bayes or Bust? (ch. 5: RT 9 - Christopher MOORE)
May 3 - Branden Fitelson: The Plurality of Bayesian Measures of Confirmation and the Problem of Measure Sensitivity (RT 10)
Further Reading: Branden Fitelson: Studies in Bayesian Confirmation Theory (ch. 2)
- David Christensen: Measuring Confirmation (RT 11 - Christopher KAWATSU)
Further Reading: James Joyce: The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory
- John Earman: Bayes or Bust? (ch. 6.1-6.8, 6.14: RT 12 - Anna Victoria MALTSEV)
Further Reading: *Haim Gaifman & Marc Snir: Probabilities over Rich Languages, Testing, and Randomness
May 10 - Hans Reichenbach: Experience and Prediction (RT 13 - Kausteya ROY)
Further Reading: Hans Reichenbach: On the Justification of Induction
- Hilary Putnam: "Degree of Confirmation" and Inductive Logic (RT 14 - Tharathorn RIMCHALA)
Further Reading: Hilary Putnam: Probability and Confirmation
- Oliver Schulte: Formal Learning Theory (RT 15 - B. Bennett COULSON)
May 17 - John Earman: Bayes or Bust? (ch. 9: RT 16)
- Franz Huber: What Is the Point of Confirmation? (RT 17)
Further Reading: Franz Huber: Assessing Theories, Bayes Style
May 22 Branden Fitelson (UC Berkeley) will give a talk on Goodman's "New Riddle"
When: 4pm, Where: Treasure Room, Dabney
May 24 no class (SEP 2006: May 18-21, FEW 2006: May 25-28)
May 31 final discussion