Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
Author name: Reinganum, Jennifer F.
Papers:
- Dynamic Games of Innovation.
- A Dynamic Game of R & D: Patent Protection and Competitive Behavior.
- A Note on Rational Threats and Competitive Equilibrium.
- Strategic Lobbying Behavior.
- On the Diffusion of New Technology: A Game Theoretic Approach.
- A Class of Differential Games Where the Closed-Loop and Open-Loop Nash Equilibria Coincide.
- Strategic Search Theory.
- Market Structure and the Diffusion of New Technology.
- Oligopoly Extraction of a Nonrenewable Common Property Resource: The Importance of the Period of Commitment in Dynamic Games.
- Technology Adoption Under Imperfect Information.
- Nash Equilibrium Search for the Best Alternative.
- Innovation and Industry Evolution.
- Uncertain Innovation and the Persistence of Monopoly.
- Research and Development with a Generalized Hazard Function.
- The Economics of Income Taxation: Compliance in a Principal-Agent Framework.
- A Two-Stage Model of Research and Development With Endogenous Second Mover Advantages.
- Practical Implications of Game Theoretic Models of R and D.
- An Equilibrium Model of Tax Compliance with a Bayesian Auditor and some 'Honest' Taxpayers.
- A Model of Tax Compliance Under Budget-Constrained Auditors.
- Sequential Equilibrium Detection and Reporting Policies in a Model of Tax Evasion.
- Settlement and Litigation Under Alternative Legal Systems.
- The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement.
- Credibility and Law Enforcement.
- Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion.
- Expert Opinions and Taxpayer Comnpliance: A Strategic Analysis.
- Equilibrium Enforcement and Compliance in the Presence of Tax Practitioners.
