Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
Author name: Banks, Jeffrey S.
Papers:
- Price-Conveyed Information vs. Observed Insider Behavior: A Note on Rational Expectations Convergence.
- Sophisticated Voting Outcomes and Agenda Control.
- Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games.
- An Experimental Analysis of Public Goods Provision Mechanisms with and without Unanimity.
- Endogenous Agenda Formation in Three-Person Committees.
- Liability Rules and Pretrial Settlememt.
- Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes.
- The Design of Mechanisms to Allocate Space Station Resources.
- Allocating Uncertain and Unresponsive Resources.
- An Experimental Analysis of Nash Refinements in Signaling Games.
- An Experimental Analysis of the Two-Armed Bandit Program
- A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice
- A bargaining model of legislative policy-making
- A Social Choice Lemma on Voting over Lotteries with Applications to a Class of Dynamic Games
