Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
Author name: McKelvey, Richard D.
Papers:
- Conditions for Voting Equilibria in Continuous Voter Distributions.
- An Impossibility Theorem for Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions.
- Experiments on the Core: Some Disconcerting Results for Majority Rule Voting Games.
- A Theory of Optimal Agenda Design.
- Implementation of Democratic Social Choice Functions.
- A Ham Sandwich Theorem for General Measures.
- Limiting Distributions for Continuous State Markov Voting Models.
- Methods for Comparison of Markov Processes by Stochastic Dominance.
- Elections with Limited Information: A Fulfilled Expectations Model Using Contemporaneous Poll and Endorsement Data as Information Sources.
- Common Knowledge and Consensus with Aggregate Statistics.
- Covering, Dominance, and Institution Free Properties of Social Choice.
- Elections with Limited Information: A Multidimensional Model.
- Sequential Elections with Limited Information.
- Structural Instability of the Core.
- Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point.
- Optimal Research for Cournot Oligopolists.
- Game Forms for Nash Implementation of General Social Choice Correspondences.
- A Decade of Experimental Research on Spatial Models of Elections and Committees.
- Public and Private Information: An Experimental Study of Information Pooling.
- Seniority in Legislatures.
- An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game.
- A Bayesian Sequential Experimental Study of Learning in Games.
- Initial Versus Continuing Proposal Power in Legislative Seniority.
- Political Competition in a Model of Economic Growth; Some Theoretical Results.
- Stationarity and Chaos in Infinitely Repeated Games of Incomplete Information
- The Holdout Game: An Experimental Study of an Infinitely Repeated Game with Two-Sided Incomplete Information
- The Maximal Number of Regular Totally Mixed Nash Equilibria
- Engodeneity of Alternating Offers in a Bargaining Game
- An Experimental Study of Constant-sum Centipede Games
- Quantal Response Equilibria For Normal Form Games
- Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games
- A Laipunov Function for Nash Equilibria
- A Statistical Theory of Equilibrium in Games
- The Effects of Payoff Magnitude and Heterogeneity on Behavior in 2X2 Games with Unique Mixed Strategy Equilibria
- An Experimental Study of the Effect of Private Information in the Coase Theorem
- An Experimental Study of Jury Decisions
- Status Quo Bias in Bargaining: An extension of the Myerson Satterthwaite Theorem with an application to the Coase Theorem
- A Theory of Voting in Large Elections
- Self-correcting Information Cascades
