Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
Author name: Camerer, Colin F.
Papers:
- An Experimental Analysis of Nash Refinements in Signaling Games.
- Outside Options and Social Comparison in 3-Player Ultimatum Game Experiments
- Loss Avoidance and Forward Induction in Experimental Coordination Games
- Rules for Experimenting in Psychology and Economics, and Why They Differ
- Labor Supply of New York City Cab Drivers: One Day At A time
- Timing and Virtual Observability in Ultimatum Bargaining and Weak Link Coordination Games
- Iterated Dominance and Iterated Best-Response in Experimental P-Beauty Contests
- Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experimental Approach
- Can Asset Markets be Manipulated? A Field Experiment with Racetrack Betting
- The Illusion of Leadership
- Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning in Games: A Unifying Approach
- Progress and Behavioral Game Theory
- Bounded Rationality in Individual Decision Making
- Prospect Theory in the Wild: Evidence From the Field
- Detecting Failures of Backward Induction: Monitoring Information Search in Sequential Bargaining
- The Econometrics and Behavioral Economics of Escalation of Commitment: A Re-examination of Staw and Hoang's NBA Data
- Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning in Sender-Receiver Signaling Games
- The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework
- Information Aggregation in Experimental Asset Markets: Traps and Misaligned Beliefs
- Increasing Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemmas by Establishing a Precedent of Efficiency in Coordination
- Sophisticated EWA Learning and Strategic Teaching in Repeated Games.
- "EWA Learning in Bilateral Call Markets."
- "Strategic Learning and Teaching."
- Economic Value of EWA Lite: A Functional Theory of Learning in Games
- Aging and decision making: A comparison between neurologically healthy elderly and young individuals
- Heterogeneous quantal response equilibrium and cognitive hierarchies
- Can Relational Contracts Survive Stochastic Interruptions?
- Quantal Response and Nonequlibrium Beliefs Explain Overbidding in Maximum-Value Auctions
