Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Author name: Ledyard, John O.

Papers:

• Incentive Compatibility and Incomplete Information.
• The Existence of Efficient and Incentive Compatible Equilibria with Public Goods.
• The Paradox of Voting and Candidate Competition: A General Equilibrium Analysis.
• The Scope of the Hypothesis of Bayesian Equilibrium.
• Theories of Price Formation and Exchange in Double Oral Auctions.
• The Economics of Space Station.
• Incentive Compatibility.
• Market Failure.
• The Design of Mechanisms to Allocate Space Station Resources.
• Allocating Uncertain and Unresponsive Resources.
• Information Aggregation in Two-Candidate Elections.
• Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms.
• Political Competition in a Model of Economic Growth; Some Theoretical Results.
• The Design of Coordination Mechanisms and Organizational Computing
• Designing Organizations for Trading Pollution Rights
• Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research
• Using Computerized Exchange Systems to Solve an Allocation Problem in Project Management
• First Best Bayesian Privatization Mechanisms
• Mutually Destructive Bidding: The FCC Auction Design Problem
• The Allocation of a Shared Resource Within an Organization
• Interim Efficiency in a Public Goods Problem
• The Results of Some Tests of Mechanism Designs for the Allocation and Pricing of Collections of Heterogeneous
• Repeated Implementation
• The Design of Multi-Object Multi-Round Auction
• A New and Improved Design For Multi-Object Iterative Auctions
• "The Approximation of Efficient Public Good Mechanisms by Simple Voting Schemes."
• "The First Use of a Combined Value Auction for Transportation Services."
• "Experimental Testbedding of a Pollution Trading System: Southern California's Reclaim Emmissions Market."
• "Inducing Liquidity In Thin Financial Markets Through Combined-Value Trading Mechanisms."
• A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments
• Market design for fishery IFQ programs

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