Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
Author name: Echenique, Federico
Papers:
- Core Many-To-One Matchings by Fixed-Point Methods
- A Characterization of Strategic Complementarities
- Finding All Equilibria
- Comparative Statics, English Auctions, and the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem
- A Theory of Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Markets
- Counting Combinatoral Choice Rules
- A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues
- An explanation of inefficient redistribution: Transfers insure cohesive groups
- Testing Models w/ multiple equilibria by quantile methods
- Supermodularizability
- What matchings can be stable? The refutability of matching theory
- Sequential entry in many-to-one matching markets
- On behavioral complementarity and its implications
- A test for monotone comparative statics
- You won’t harm me if you fool me
- The core matchings of markets with transfers
- When does aggregation reduce uncertainty aversion?
- Implications of Pareto Efficiency for two-agent (household) choice
- Testable implications of gross substitutes in demand
- Clearinghouses for two-sided matching: An experimental study
- Aggregate matchings
- The axiomatic structure of empirical content
- Contracts vs. salaries in matching
- Revealed preference tests using supermarket data: The money pump
- General revealed preference theory
- A revealed preference approach to computational complexity in economics
- Existence and testable implications of extreme stable matchings
- Testable Implications of Bargaining Theories
- Finding a Walrasian Equilibrium is easy for a fixed number of agents
- How to control controlled school choice
- Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching
- Stragegic uncertainty and unraveling in matching markets
