Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
Author name: Palfrey, Thomas R.
Papers:
- An Experimental Examination of Auction Mechanisms for Discrete Public Goods.
- Multiple-Object Discriminatory Auctions with Bidding Constraints: A Game-Theoretic Analysis.
- Asset Valuation in an Experimental Market.
- Participation and the Provision of Discrete Public Goods: A Strategic Analysi
- Agendas, Strategic Voting, and Signaling with Incomplete Information.
- Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty About Costs.
- On Bayesian Implementable Allocations.
- Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies.
- Mechanism Design with Incomplete Information: A Solution to the Implementation Problem.
- Private Incentives in Social Dilemmas: The Effect of Incomplete Information and Altruism.
- Theories and Tests of (Blind Bidding) in Sealed Bid Auctions.
- A Mathematical Proof of Duverger's Law.
- Testing for Effects of Cheap Talk in a Public Goods Game with Private Information.
- Efficient Trading Mechanisms with Pre-Play Communication.
- Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms.
- Testing Game-Theoretic Models of Free Riding: New Evidence on Probability Bias and Learning.
- Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement.
- An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game.
- Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanism.
- A Bayesian Sequential Experimental Study of Learning in Games.
- Implementation in Bayesian Equilibrium: The Multiple Equilibrium Problem in Mechanism Design.
- Repeated Play, Cooperation and Coordination: An Experimental Study.
- Vertigo: Comparing Structural Models of Imperfect Behavior in Experimental Games.
- Stationarity and Chaos in Infinitely Repeated Games of Incomplete Information
- The Holdout Game: An Experimental Study of an Infinitely Repeated Game with Two-Sided Incomplete Information
- Anomalous Behavior in Linear Public Goods Experiments: How Much and Why?
- The Spending Game: Money, Votes, and Incumbency in Congressional Elections
- Altruism, Reputation, and Noise in Linear Public Goods Experiments
- Engodeneity of Alternating Offers in a Bargaining Game
- An Experimental Study of Constant-sum Centipede Games
- In or Out?: Centralization by Majority Vote
- Quantal Response Equilibria For Normal Form Games
- Economical Experiments: Bayesian Efficient Experimental Design
- Implementation Theory
- Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games
- A Statistical Theory of Equilibrium in Games
- Interim Efficiency in a Public Goods Problem
- Dynamic Efficiency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining
- Political Confederation
- The Effects of Payoff Magnitude and Heterogeneity on Behavior in 2X2 Games with Unique Mixed Strategy Equilibria
- Equilibrium Effects in Campaign Spending Games: Theory and Data
- An Experimental Study of Jury Decisions
- Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private-value Auctions
- Voluntary Implementation
- "The Approximation of Efficient Public Good Mechanisms by Simple Voting Schemes."
- Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model With a Favored Candidate
- The Effect of Candidate Quality on Electoral Equilibrium: An Experimental Study
- Spatial Competition Between Two Candidates of Different Quality: The Effects of Candidate Ideology and Private Information
- A Voting Model of Federal Standards with Externalities
- Endogenous Entry and Self-selection in Private Value Auctions: An Experimental Study
- An Experimental Study of Storable Votes
- A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments
- Social learning with private and common values
- Self-correcting Information Cascades
- Regular quantal response equilibrium
- Regular Quantal Response Equilibrium
- Political reputations and campaign promises
- The compromise game: Two-sided adverse selection in the laboratory
- Heterogeneous quantal response equilibrium and cognitive hierarchies
- Minorities and storable votes
- Efficiency, equity, and timing of voting mechanisms
- The Swing Voter's Curse in the laboratory
- On eliciting beliefs in strategic games
- The dynamics of distributive politics
- No Trade
- Information aggregation in standing and ad hoc committees (formerly: Information aggregation and equilibrium selection in committees)
- Network architecture, salience and coordination
- A citizen candidate model with private information and unique equilibrium
- Information aggregation & strategic abstention in large laboratory elections
- Speculative overpricing in asset markets with information flows (Revised)
- Information gatekeepers: Theory and experimental evidence
- Political institutions and the dynamics of public investment
- Competitive equillibrium in markets for votes (revised)
- Candidate Entry and Political Polarization: An anti-median voter theorem
- Quantal Response and Nonequlibrium Beliefs Explain Overbidding in Maximum-Value Auctions
- Legislative bargaining and the dynamics of public investment
- The Free Rider Problem: A Dynamic analysis (Revised March 2012)
- Turnout and Power Sharing
- Vote Trading with and without Party Leaders
- Symmetric play in repeated allocation games
- External validation of voter turnout models by concealed parameter recovery
- The dynamic free rider problem: A laboratory study
