Thomas R. Palfrey
Flintridge Foundation Professor of Economics and Political Science
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Office: 301A Baxter Hall Email: trp@hss.caltech.edu Tel: 626-395-4088 |
Mailing Address: California Institute of Technology Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences MC 228-77 Pasadena, CA 91125 |
Research interests
Formal Political Theory, Game Theory, Experimental Economics, Experimental Political Science, Political Economy, Mechanism Design.
Publications
"Self-Correcting Information Cascades", (with J. Goeree, B. Rogers, and R. McKelvey) Review of Economic Studies, forthcoming 2006.
"The Paradox of Voter Participation: A Laboratory Study" (with D. Levine) ) American Political Science Review, forthcoming 2006.
"A General Characterization of Interim Efficient Mechanisms for Independent Linear Environments", (with J. Ledyard) Journal of Economic Theory, forthcoming 2006.
"Political Reputations and Campaign Promises" (with E. Aragones and A. Postlewaite) Journal of the European Economic Association, forthcoming 2006.
"An Equilibrium Model of Federalism with Externalities", (with J. Crémer) Journal of Public Economics, forthcoming 2006
"An Experimental Study of Storable Votes", (with A. Casella and A. Gelman) Games and Economic Behavior. Forthcoming 2006.