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Membership in Citizen Groups
Paper Number: 1206
Date: 10/01/2004
Abstract:
We address the coordination problem of individuals deciding to join an association that provides a public good and selective benefits to its members, when ability of the association to fulfill its purposes depends on membership size. In a global game formulation, we show that a unique equilibrium with non-trivial membership exists, and we perform meaningful comparative statics. A unique equilibrium also obtains when agents are heterogeneous, and we show that heterogeneity decreases membership size. In a two-period setting, where seniority of membership entails additional benefits, we provide conditions for uniqueness of equilibrium, and show that the presence of seniority benefits increases membership in both periods.
Paper Length: 28 pages
Paper: wp1206.pdf