Federico Echenique

Allen and Lenabelle Davis Professor of Economics
Licenciado, University of the Republic (Uruguay), 1995; Ph.D., University of California, 2000. Instructor, Caltech, 2002-03; Assistant Professor, 2004; Associate Professor, 2004-10; Professor, 2010-16; Davis Professor, 2016-; Executive Officer, 2013-16.

RESEARCH AREAS

Applied Microeconomics; Economics and Computer Science; Economic Theory

RESEARCH INTERESTS

Microeconomic Theory; Game Theory; Mathematical Economics

PROFILE

Federico Echenique focuses on understanding economic models of agents and markets. He's interested in determining the testable implications of models and the relationship between different theoretical models. In particular, he's studying the testable implications of models of individual decision making, of markets, and of other economic institutions. He is also studying two-sided matching markets, such as the labor market, and is active in research at the intersection of economics and computer science.

Prior to his time at Caltech, Echenique was an assistant professor at the Universidad de la República in Uruguay from 2000 to 2002 and an assistant professor at Universidad Torcuato Di Tella in Buenos Aires from 2001 to 2002. He was also a visiting assistant professor at the University of California, Berkeley, in the spring of 2001. His awards include the Morosoli Prize (2011) from the Fundación Lolita Rubial and the Eliot J. Swan Prize (1998) from the Department of Economics at UC Berkeley. He received excellence in refereeing awards from the American Economic Review (2012 and 2013).

Echenique has been an associate editor of the Journal of Economic Theory since 2013 and was a co-editor of the Journal of Theoretical Economics from 2007 to 2013. He is also on the editorial board of The Economic Journal, Economic Theory, Economic Theory Bulletin, and Decisions in Economics and Finance.

Selected Publications 
  1. "The Axiomatic Structure of Empirical Content" (with Chris Chambers and Eran Shmaya); American Economic Review, forthcoming. [PDF]
  2. "The Revealed Preference Theory of Stable and Extremal Stable Matchings" (with SangMok Lee, Bumin Yenmez, and Matt Shum) Econometrica, Volume 81, No. 1 (January 2013), pp 153-171. [PDF]
  3. "Contracts vs. Salaries in Matching" American Economic Review, Volume 102, Issue 1, February 2012, pages 594-601. [PDF]
  4. "The Money Pump as a Measure of Revealed Preference Violations" (with SangMok Lee and Matt Shum) Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 119, No. 6, December 2011. [PDF]
  5. "Testing Models with Multiple Equilibria by Quantile Methods" (with Ivana Komunjer), Econometrica, Volume 77 Issue 4, July 2009, pp 1281-1298. [PDF]
  6. "Supermodularity and Preferences" (with Chris Chambers), Journal of Economic Theory,. Volume 144, Issue 3, May 2009, Pages 1004-1014 [PDF]
  7. "What Matchings can be Stable ? The Testable Implications of Matching Theory" Mathematics of Operations Research, Volume 33 Issue 3, August 2008. Pages 757-768. [PDF].
  8. "A Measure of Segregation Based on Social Interactions" (with Roland Fryer), Quarterly Journal of Economics Volume 122(2), May 2007, pages 441-485. [PDF] The calculated segregation indices for major US cities are HERE.
  9. "Comparative Statics by Adaptive Dynamics and The Correspondence Principle," Econometrica, v70(2), March 2002 [PDF]. The working paper version (Berkeley WP E00-273) contains more results and details.


 

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